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Abstract— Despite the widespread use of machine learning
algorithms to solve problems of technological, economic, and
social relevance, provable guarantees on the performance of
these data-driven algorithms are critically lacking, especially
when the data originates from unreliable sources and is
transmitted over unprotected and easily accessible channels.
In this paper we take an important step to bridge this gap
and formally show that, in a quest to optimize their accuracy,
binary classification algorithms – including those based on
machine-learning techniques – inevitably become more sensitive
to adversarial manipulation of the data. Further, for a given
class of algorithms with the same complexity (i.e., number
of classification boundaries), the fundamental tradeoff curve
between accuracy and sensitivity depends solely on the statistics
of the data, and cannot be improved by tuning the algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms,
including neural networks, are used widely in technological,
social and economic applications, such as computer vision
[1], [2], speech recognition [3], [4], and malware detection
[5]. While these algorithms typically achieve high perfor-
mance under nominal and well-modeled conditions, they are
also very sensitive to small, targeted, and possibly malicious
manipulations of the training and execution data [6]. The
reasons for this unreliable behavior are still largely unknown,
thus motivating the critical need for novel theories and tools
to deploy robust, reliable, and safe data-driven algorithms.
In this paper we formally reveal a fundamental and
previously unknown tradeoff between the accuracy of a
binary classification algorithm and its sensitivity to arbitrary
manipulation of the data. In particular, we cast a binary
classification problem into an hypothesis testing framework,
parametrize classification algorithms – including those based
on machine learning techniques – using their decision bound-
aries, and show that the accuracy of the algorithm can
be maximized only at the expenses of its sensitivity. This
tradeoff, which applies to general classification algorithms,
depends on the statistics of the data, and cannot be improved
by simply tuning the algorithm. Our theory explains quantita-
tively how simple algorithms can outperform more complex
implementations when operating in adversarial environments.
Related work: Recent work has shown that classification
based on neural networks is vulnerable to adversarial per-
turbations [6], [7], and that these perturbations are universal
and affect a large number of classification algorithms. While
heuristic explanations of this phenomenon and heuristic
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techniques have been proposed, including adversarial learn-
ing [7]–[12], black-box [8], and gradient-based [7], [9], a
fundamental analytical understanding of the limitations of
classification algorithms under adversarial perturbations is
critically lacking. We identify these limitations for a binary
classification problem in a Bayesian setting. While in simple
setting, our analysis formally shows that a fundamental
tradeoff exists between accuracy and sensitivity of any
classification algorithm, independently of the complexity of
the algorithm. The papers [10], [13], [14] are also related
to this study, which derive methods to measure robustness
of different classifiers against adversarial perturbations and
obtain guarantees against bounded perturbations, as well
as [11], which shows how adversarial training improves
the classifier’s performance against adversarial perturbations
while deteriorating its performance under nominal condi-
tions. Our approach provides rigorous mathematical support
to the empirical evidence obtained in these works.
Contribution: This paper features three main contributions.
First, we propose metrics to quantify the accuracy of a classi-
fication algorithm and its sensitivity to arbitrary manipulation
of the data. We prove that, under a set of mild technical
assumptions, the accuracy of a classification algorithm can
only be maximized at the expenses of its sensitivity. Thus,
a fundamental tradeoff exists between the performance of a
classification algorithm in nominal and adversarial settings.
While our results formally apply to binary classification
problems, we conjecture that this fundamental tradeoff in fact
applies to more general classification problems. Second, we
show that a tradeoff between accuracy and sensitivity exists
for different classes of classification algorithms, and that
simpler algorithms can sometimes outperform more complex
one in adversarial settings. Third, for a fixed complexity of
the classification algorithm, we numerically show that the
accuracy versus robustness tradeoff depends solely on the
statistics of the data, and cannot be arbitrarily improved
by tuning the classification algorithm, including using so-
phisticated adversarial learning techniques. Taken together,
our results suggest that performance and robustness of data-
driven algorithms are dictated by the properties of the data,
and not by the sophistication or intelligence of the algorithm.
II. PROBLEM SETUP AND PRELIMINARY NOTIONS
To reveal a fundamental tradeoff between the accuracy
of a classification algorithm and its robustness against mali-
cious data manipulation, we consider a binary classification
problem where the objective is to decide whether a scalar
observation x ∈ R belongs to one of the classes H0 and H1.
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We assume that the distribution of the observations satisfy
H0 : x ∼ f0(x; θ0), and H1 : x ∼ f1(x; θ1), (1)
where f0(x; θ0) and f1(x; θ1) are arbitrary, yet known, prob-
ability density functions with parameters θ0 ∈ Rm0 and θ1 ∈
Rm1 , respectively. We assume that the partial derivatives of
fk with respect to x and θk exist and are continuous over
the domain of the distributions, for k = 0, 1. Let p0 and p1
denote the prior probabilities of the observations belonging
to the classes H0 and H1, respectively. Different (machine
learning) algorithms can be used to solve the above binary
classification problem. Yet, because of the binary nature of
the problem, any classification algorithm can be represented
by a suitable partition of the real line, and it can be written as
C(x; y) =
{
H0, x ∈ R0,
H1, x ∈ R1,
(2)
where1 y = [yi] denotes a set of boundary points, with
y0 ≤ · · · ≤ yn+1, y0 = −∞, yn+1 =∞, and
R0 = {z : yi < z < yi+1, with i = 0, 2, . . . , n},
R1 = {z : yi ≤ z ≤ yi+1, with i = 1, 3, . . . , n− 1}.
We refer to (2) as general classifier. We measure the per-
formance of a classification algorithm through its accuracy,
that is, its probability of making a correct classification.
Definition 1: (Accuracy of a classifier) The accuracy of
the classification algorithm C(x; y) is
A(y; θ) = p0P [x ∈ R0|H0] + p1P [x ∈ R1|H1] , (3)
where θ = [θT0 θ
T
1 ]
T contains the distribution parameters. 
Using Equation (3) and the distributions in (1), we obtain
A(y; θ) = p0
(
n∑
l=1
(−1)l+1
yl∫
−∞
f0(x; θ0)dx+ 1
)
+ p1
(
n∑
l=1
(−1)l
yl∫
−∞
f1(x; θ1)dx
)
.
(4)
Clearly, the accuracy of a classification algorithm depends
on the position of its boundaries, which can be selected to
maximize the accuracy of the classification algorithm. To this
aim, let L(x) denote the Likelihood Ratio defined as
L(x) =
p1f1(x; θ1)
p0f0(x; θ0)
.
The Maximum Likelihood (ML) classifier is
CML(x; η) =
{
H0, L(x) < η,
H1, L(x) ≥ η,
(5)
where the threshold η > 0 is a design parameter that
determines the boundary points and, thus, the accuracy of
1For simplicity and without affecting generality, we assume that n is even.
Further, an alternative configuration of the classifier (2) assigns H0 and H1
to R1 and R0, respectively. However, because accuracy and sensitivity of
the two configurations can be obtained from each other, we consider only
the configuration in (2) without affecting the generality of our analysis.
the classifier. As a known result in statistical hypothesis
testing [15], the accuracy of the ML classifier with η = 1
is the largest among all possible classifiers. The value and
the number of boundary points of the ML classifier depend
on the distributions f0(x; θ0) and f1(x; θ1), the threshold η,
and the prior probabilities through the equation
p1f1(x; θ1)− ηp0f0(x; θ0) = 0. (6)
Another important class of classifiers is the class of linear
classifiers, which are less complex and often achieve a
competitive performance compared to nonlinear classifiers
(see [16] for more details). In our setting, a linear classifier
consists of one decision boundary y ∈ R, and is given by
CL(x; y) =
{
H0, x < y,
H1, x ≥ y.
(7)
Following Definition 1, the accuracy of CL is
A(y; θ) = p0
y∫
−∞
f0(x; θ0)dx− p1
y∫
−∞
f1(x; θ1)dx+ p1. (8)
The optimal boundary y∗L that maximizes A(y; θ) is
y∗L = arg max
yi
A(yi; θ)
s.t. yi is a solution of (6) with η = 1.
(9)
While the boundaries are difficult to compute for general
distributions, they can be computed explicitly when the
observations are Gaussian (see below). Let N (x;µ, σ) =
1√
2piσ2
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 be the p.d.f. of a normal random variable
with mean µ and variance σ, and Q(z) =
∫ z
−∞
1√
2pi
e
−x2
2 dx
the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution.
Remark 1: (ML and linear classifiers for Gaussian
distributions) For the Gaussian distributions fi(x; θi) =
N (x;µi, σi), i = 0, 1, the boundaries of ML classifier satisfy
ax2 + bx+ c = 0 where, (10)
a =
1
2
(
1
σ20
− 1
σ21
)
, b =
(
µ1
σ21
− µ0
σ20
)
, and
c = log
(
σ0
σ1
)
+ log
(
p1
p0
)
+
µ20
2σ20
− µ
2
1
2σ21
− log(η).
Equation (10) has at most two real solutions, implying that
the ML classifier has at most two decision boundaries (see
Fig. 1). The ML classifier with boundaries corresponding to
the solutions of (10) with η = 1 has maximum accuracy
[15]. The solution of (10) which maximizes the accuracy in
(8) is the boundary for the optimal linear classifier. 
To characterize the robustness of a classifier to adversarial
manipulation of the observations, we define the following
sensitivity metric, which capture the degradations of the clas-
sification accuracy following data manipulation. It should be
noticed that, by manipulating the observations, the adversary
effectively changes the parameters of the distributions in (1).
Fig. 1. The distributions of x under Gaussian hypotheses with µ0 = 0,
σ0 = 9, µ1 = 9, σ1 = 4, and p0 = p1 = 0.5. The dashed red lines
represent the decision boundaries of the CML(x; η = 1), which divide the
space into R0 (represented by the blue region) and R1 (orange region).
Definition 2: (Sensitivity of a classifier) The sensitivity
of the classification algorithm2 C(x; y) is
S(y; θ) =
∥∥∥∥∂A(y; θ)∂θ
∥∥∥∥
∞
, (11)
where θ contains the parameters of the distributions in (1),
and A(y; θ) denotes the accuracy of C(x; y). 
From Definition 2, a higher value of sensitivity implies that
the adversary can affect the classifier’s performance to a
larger extent, whereas a lower sensitivity implies that the
classifier is more robust to adversarial manipulation. Further,
the ∞−norm captures the worst case scenario in terms of
the largest sensitivity with respect to the components of θ.
Remark 2: (Accuracy and sensitivity of the ML classifier
for Gaussian distributions) The accuracy and the sensitivity
of the ML classifier are obtained by substituting the expres-
sion of the normal distributions N (x;µi, σi) in (3) and (11):
A(y; θ) = p0
(
Q
(y1 − µ0
σ0
)
−Q
(y2 − µ0
σ0
)
+ 1
)
+ p1
(
−Q
(y1 − µ1
σ1
)
+Q
(y2 − µ1
σ1
))
and,
S(y; θ) =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥

p0
(
f0
(
y2; θ0
)− f0(y1; θ0))
p0
(
µ0−y1
σ0
f0(y1; θ0)− µ0−y2σ0 f0(y2; θ0)
)
p1
(
f1(y1; θ1)− f1(y2; θ1)
)
p1
(
µ1−y2
σ1
f1(y2; θ1)− µ1−y1σ1 f1(y1; θ1)
)

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞
,
where θi = [µi σi]T and i = 0, 1. 
A classification algorithm should be designed to have high
accuracy and low sensitivity, so as to exhibit robust satis-
factory performance in the face of adversarial manipulation.
Unfortunately, in this paper we show that accuracy and sen-
sitivity are directly related, so that optimizing the accuracy
of a classifier inevitably also increases its sensitivity.
III. A FUNDAMENTAL TRADEOFF BETWEEN ACCURACY
AND SENSITIVITY OF CLASSIFICATION ALGORITHMS
In this section, we characterize the tradeoff between
accuracy and sensitivity of a classification algorithm for a
given binary classification problem as described in (1). In
particular, we prove that under some mild conditions, there
2Definition 2 is also valid for the ML and the linear classifier.
exist a classifier that is less accurate than CML(x; 1), yet
more robust to adversarial manipulation of the observations.
This shows that there exist a tradeoff between accuracy and
sensitivity at the the maximum accuracy configuration.
Let y∗ = [y∗1 y
∗
2 · · · y∗n]T be the vector of the boundaries
of CML(x; 1), which maximizes A(y; θ). Let θ(i) be the ith
component of θ. We make the following assumptions:
A1: The vector ∂A(y;θ)∂θ
∣∣∣
y∗
has a unique largest absolute
element, located at index j.
A2: There exist at least one boundary y∗i such that(
p0
∂
∂yi
f0(yi; θ0)
∣∣∣∣∣
y∗i
− p1 ∂
∂yi
f1(yi; θ1)
∣∣∣∣∣
y∗i
)
∂y∗i
∂θ(j)
6= 0.
Assumptions A1 is specific to our definition of sensitivity in
(11), and is not required if 2−norm is used (see Remark 4).
Further, A2 is mild and typically satisfied in most problems.
Theorem 3.1: (Accuracy vs. sensitivity tradeoff for clas-
sifier (2)) Let y∗ contain the boundaries of the classifier
CML(x; 1). Then, under Assumptions A1 and A2, it holds
∂S(y; θ)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y∗
6= 0. (12)
Proof: Assumption A1 guarantees that sensitivity
S(y; θ) is differentiable with respect to y at y∗. Let g(y; θ) ,
∂A(y;θ)
∂y . Since y
∗ maximizes A(y; θ), we have g(y∗; θ) = 0.
Differentiating g
(
y∗; θ
)
with respect to θ(j), and noting that
y∗ depends on θ, we get:
dg
(
y∗; θ
)
dθ(j)
=
∂g
(
y; θ
)
∂θ(j)
∣∣∣∣∣
y∗
+
∂g
(
y; θ
)
∂y
∣∣∣∣∣
y∗
∂y∗
∂θ(j)
= 0,
⇒ ∂
∂y
∂A(y; θ)
θ(j)
∣∣∣∣∣
y∗
= −∂
2A(y; θ)
∂y2
∣∣∣∣∣
y∗
∂y∗
∂θ(j)
, (13)
where the last equation follows by substituting g
(
y; θ
)
=
∂A(y;θ)
∂y and switching the order of partial differentiation.
Using (11), it can be easily observed that the left side of
(13) equals ±∂S(y;θ)∂y
∣∣∣
y∗
. Further, differentiating (4) twice,
we get ∂
2
∂y2A(y; θ) = diag(w1(y1), · · · , wn(yn)) , where
wi(yi) = p0(−1)i+1 ∂
∂yi
f0(yi; θ0) + p1(−1)i ∂
∂yi
f1(yi; θ1).
Assumption A2 guarantees that there exist a boundary y∗i
such that wi(y∗i )
∂y∗i
∂θ(j)
6= 0. The reult follows from (13).
Theorem 3.1 implies that the sensitivity of the classifier
C(x; y) can be decreased by modifying the boundaries y∗.
Yet, because C(x; y∗) exhibits the largest classification ac-
curacy among all classifiers, the reduction of sensitivity
inevitably decreases the accuracy of classification. In other
words, for any classification problem (1) satisfying Assump-
tion A1 and A2 and for any classification algorithm (2), there
exists an arbitrarily small δ such that3
S(y∗ + δ; θ) < S(y∗; θ) and A(y∗ + δ; θ) ≤ A(y∗; θ).
3The inequality for accuracy is strict for most distributions.
This result also implies that the robustness of a classification
algorithm to adversarial manipulation of the data can be
increased only at the expense of its accuracy of classification.
Thus, a fundamental tradeoff exists between the accuracy of
a classifier and its robustness to adversarial manipulation.
Corollary 3.2: (Accuracy and sensitivity of the linear
classifier (7)) Let y∗L be the boundary given in (9) that
maximizes the accuracy (in (8)) of the linear classifier
CL(x; y). Then, under Assumptions A1 and A2, it holds
∂S(y; θ)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y∗L
6= 0. (14)
Proof: Since y∗L corresponds to one of the boundaries
contained in y∗, the proof follows from Theorem 3.1.
Next, we show that this tradeoff also exists for the
Maximum Likelihood classifier. This fact does not follow
trivially from Theorem 3.1, because the general classifier in
Theorem has independent boundaries, while the boundaries
of the Maximum Likelihood are dependent from one another
via (6). We make the following mild technical assumption.
A3: The vectors ∂y(η,θ)∂η
∣∣∣
η=1
and ∂S(y;θ)∂y
∣∣∣
y∗
are not orthogo-
nal, where y(η, θ) contains the boundaries of CML(x; η).
Lemma 3.3: (Accuracy and sensitivity of the ML classi-
fier (5)) Let y(η, θ) contain the boundaries of the classifier
CML(x; η). Then, under Assumptions A1, A2 and A3, it holds
∂S (y(η, θ); θ)
∂η
∣∣∣∣
η=1
6= 0.
Proof: Let y∗ contain the boundaries of the classifier
CML(x; η = 1). The derivative of S
(
y(η, θ); θ
)
with respect
to η can be written as:
∂S(y(η, θ); θ)
∂η
∣∣∣∣∣
η=1
=
∂S(y; θ)
∂yT
∣∣∣∣∣
y∗
∂y(η, θ)
∂η
∣∣∣∣
η=1
.
We conclude following Theorem 3.1 and Assumption A3.
In what follows we numerically show that a tradeoff
between accuracy and sensitivity also exists when the classi-
fication boundaries are not selected to maximize the accuracy
of the classifier. To this aim, first we compute the accuracy
and sensitivity of the ML classifier CML(x; η), for different
values of η. Notice that, by varying 0 ≤ η <∞, Equation (6)
returns different classification boundaries and, thus, different
classification algorithms. Similarly, we compute the accuracy
and sensitivity of linear classifier CL(x; y) by varying the
single boundary y. Second, we numerically solve
min
y
S(y; θ)
s.t. A(y; θ) = ζ,
(15)
for different values of ζ ranging from 0.5 to A(y∗; θ). Notice
that the minimization problem (15) returns the classifier
with lowest sensitivity and accuracy equal to ζ, and that
the boundaries solving the minimization problem (15) may
not satisfy (6). Further, for a given number of classification
boundaries, the minimization problem (15) returns a funda-
mental tradeoff curve relating accuracy and sensitivity over
the range of ζ, which is independent of the choice of clas-
sification algorithm. Finally, the minimization problem (15)
is not convex, because of its nonlinear equality constraint.
Fig. 2(a) shows the accuracy-sensitivity tradeoff for the
Gaussian hypothesis testing problem discussed in Remark
2. In this case, since the ML classifier has 2 boundaries,
we also consider general classifiers with 2 boundaries. We
observe that the general classifier exhibits the tradeoff at
the maximum accuracy point (identified by the red dot)
in accordance with Theorem 3.1. Several comments are in
order. First, the ML and linear classifiers also exhibit tradeoff
at their respective maximum accuracy points in accordance
with Lemmas 3.3 and 3.2. Second, the tradeoff for the ML
classifier is not strict and there exist points where reducing
accuracy increases sensitivity (green dot in the figure). On the
other hand, the tradeoff for the general classifier is strict. This
is because the decision boundaries of the general classifier
can be varied independently, whereas the boundaries of
the ML classifier are related to each other since they are
the solutions of (6). Thus, the general classifier provides
more flexibility in choosing the boundaries. Similarly, the
tradeoff for the linear classifier is not strict. Third, the
tradeoff curve for the general classifier is below the tradeoff
curves for the ML and linear classifier, again, due to the
aforementioned reason.4 Fourth, the maximum accuracy of
the linear classifier (corresponding to red square) is smaller
than that of ML classifier (corresponding to the red dot),
but its sensitivity at the maximum accuracy configuration is
also smaller than that of the ML classifier. This explains the
observed phenomena that in some cases, linear models are
more robust to adversarial attacks than nonlinear models (for
example, neural networks) [17]. Finally, the curves are not
smooth because of the ∞-norm in the definition (2).
We conclude with two remarks on using the 2-norm to
define sensitivity and on the necessity of Assumption A1.
Remark 3: (Classification sensitivity using the 2−norm)
In Definition 2, the ∞-norm captures the largest change in
accuracy with respect to a change in a single component of
parameters vector θ. Instead, using the 2-norm to define the
sensitivity of a classification algorithm leads to
S(y; θ) =
∥∥∥∥∂A(y; θ)∂θ
∥∥∥∥
2
, (16)
which captures the change in accuracy with respect to
changes in all the components of θ. Fig. 2(b) shows the sen-
sitivity versus accuracy tradeoff when sensitivity is defined
using (16) instead of (11). Here, a strict tradeoff exists for
the general, ML and linear classifiers. Further, the tradeoff
curves are smooth since the 2-norm is a smooth function.
Remark 4: (Necessity of Assumption A1) Theorem 3.1
may not hold when Assumption A1 is not satisfied, and
we illustrate this fact in Fig. 2(c). In this case, the vector
∂A(y∗;θ)
∂θ = [0.043 0.024 − 0.043 0.040]T has two elements
with maximum absolute value, violating Assumption A1. As
a result, a tradeoff at the maximum accuracy point (denoted
4ML and linear classifiers are particular instances of the general classifier.
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Fig. 2. Sensitivity-accuracy tradeoff curves for a general classifier with 2 boundaries (black dashed line), the ML classifier (blue line), and a linear
classifier (orange dash-dotted line) corresponding to the Gaussian hypothesis testing problem. The parameters of the two distributions for Fig. 2(a)-(b) are
µ0 = 0, σ0 = 9, µ1 = 9, and σ1 = 4, and for Fig. 2(c) are µ0 = 0, σ0 = 4, µ1 = 5, and σ1 = 3. The red dot represents CML(x; 1) (maximum accuracy
point) and the green dot represents CML(x; 0.46). The red square represents CL(x; y = 3.65), which is the linear classifier with maximum accuracy. The
sensitivity in 2(a) and 2(c) is computed using Definition 2, while the sensitivity in Fig. 2(b) is computed using (16).
TABLE I
NUMERICAL RESULTS
Classifier y1 y2 S(y; θ) A(y; θ) As1(x) As2(x)
C1 3.65 18.78 0.0334 0.7891 0.6857 0.6808
C2 1.83 20.60 0.0201 0.7766 0.6947 0.6939
by red dot) does not exists as shown in the figure. Yet, a
tradeoff still exist for sensitivity defined as in (16), indicating
that A1 might be required only for definition (11). 
IV. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
In this section we illustrate numerically the implications
of Theorem 3.1. In particular, we consider two classifica-
tion algorithms with different accuracy and sensitivity, and
show how their performance degrades differently when the
observations are corrupted by an adversary. This implies
that, when robustness to adversarial manipulation of the
observations is a concern, classification algorithms should be
designed to simultaneously optimize accuracy and sensitivity,
and should not operate at their point of maximum accuracy.
Consider the classification problem (1), and let
f0(x, θ0) = N (x;µ0, σ0), f1(x, θ1) = N (x;µ1, σ1). (17)
Let C1 = CML(x; 1) and C2 = CML(x; 0.4603) be the clas-
sification algorithms identified by the red and green points
in Fig. 2(a), respectively. Notice that, when the observations
are not manipulated and follow the distributions (17), C1
achieves higher accuracy and sensitivity than C2. This is also
the case when using definition (16), as illustrated in Fig. 2(b).
While the nominal distributions (17) are used to design the
classifiers C1 and C2, we consider an adversary that manip-
ulates the observations so that their true distributions are
f0(x, θ0) = N (x;µ0 + µ¯0, σ0 + σ¯0), and
f1(x, θ1) = N (x;µ1 + µ¯1, σ1 + σ¯1),
(18)
where µ¯0, µ¯1, σ¯0, and σ¯1 are unknown parameters selected
by the adversary to deteriorate the accuracy of the classifiers.
To evaluate the accuracy of C1 and C2 to classify the
manipulated observations, we generate 10000 observations
obeying the modified distributions (18), and compute the
accuracy of the classifiers as the ratio of the number of
correct predictions to the total number of observations. We
repeat this experiment 100 times, and then compute the
average accuracy of the classifiers over all trials.
Table I summarizes the results of the classification prob-
lems with C1 and C2 on the altered observations. In particu-
lar, y1 and y2 are the decision boundaries of the classifiers,
while S(y; θ) and A(y; θ) denote their nominal sensitivity
and accuracy. Instead,As1(x) andAs2(x) denote the average
accuracy of the classifiers when, respectively, the adversarial
parameters are µ¯1 = µ¯0 = σ¯0 = 0, σ¯1 = 3, and µ¯0 = 1,
σ¯0 = 2, µ¯1 = −2, σ¯1 = 1.5. The results show that, although
C1 exhibits higher accuracy that C2 when the observations
follow the nominal distributions (17), C2 outperforms C1 in
both adversarial scenarios, as supported by our analysis.
V. DEPENDENCY OF ACCURACY AND SENSITIVITY ON
THE PARAMETERS OF THE DISTRIBUTIONS
In this section we analyze the effect of the parameters
θ = [θ0 θ1]
T on the accuracy and sensitivity of the
classifiers. We consider the Maximum Likelihood classifier
CML(x; η = 1) for the analysis since it maximizes the
accuracy.5 Specifically, we wish to determine the distribution
parameters that minimize the sensitivity while providing a
given level of accuracy. We consider the following problem:
min
θ∈Θ
S(y∗(θ), θ)
s.t. A(y∗(θ), θ) = γ, (19)
where y∗(θ) denotes the boundaries of the ML classifier
CML(x; 1), which depend on θ via (6), 0.5 ≤ γ ≤ 1 denotes
the accuracy level, and Θ denotes the set of admissible
parameters θ of the distributions. The optimization problem
(19) captures the fundamental limit of sensitivity that can be
achieved by a ML classifier with a desired level of accuracy.
Note that, similarly to (15), the optimization problem in (19)
is not convex due to the nonlinear equality constraint.
5A similar analysis can also be performed for general and linear classi-
fiers. However, we omit this analysis due to space constraints.
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Fig. 3. (a) Minimum sensitivity (of (19)) is a decreasing function of
accuracy. (b) θ∗(γ) = [µ∗0, σ
∗
0 , µ
∗
1, σ
∗
1 ]
T denotes the optimal parameters
of (19), with ∆µ∗ = |µ∗0 − µ∗1|. The constraints on θ are |µ0 − µ1| ≤
40, 0.1 ≤ σ1 ≤ σ0 ≤ 15. ∆µ∗ is non-decreasing and σ∗0 , σ∗1 are
non-increasing functions of γ, indicating that accuracy increases with the
separation between the distributions f0 and f1.
Let θ∗(γ) and S∗(γ) denote the optimal parameters and
minimum sensitivity of the optimization problem in (19). Fig.
3(a) shows the variation of S∗(γ) as a function of accuracy
level γ for the Gaussian hypothesis testing problem detailed
in Remark 2. It can be observed that S∗(γ) is a decreasing
function of γ. This is due to the fact that, to achieve a
higher level of accuracy, the “separation” between the two
distributions should be larger, as evident in Fig. 3(b). At a
larger separation, the effect of changes in the distribution
parameters on the accuracy of the classifier is smaller,
thereby resulting in a smaller sensitivity.
Lemma 5.1: (Accuracy and sensitivity for Gaussian test-
ing) Consider an hypothesis testing problem with f0 =
N (x;µ0, σ) and f1 = N (x;µ1, σ), with θ = [µ0 µ1]T and
p0 = p1 = 0.5. Assume that σ is fixed. Then, for classifier
CML(x; 1), S∗(γ) is a decreasing function of accuracy γ.
Proof: For the Gaussian testing problem with σ0 =
σ1 = σ, p0 = p1 = 0.5, Equation (6) has a single solution
for η = 1 given by y∗(θ) = µ0+µ12 . Using (8), the accuracy
is given by A(y∗(θ); θ) = Q
(
|µ1−µ0|
2σ
)
. Since σ is fixed, we
take the derivative of A(y∗(θ); θ) with respect to the means:
S(y∗(θ); θ)= 1
2σ
√
2pi
e−
(µ1−µ0)2
2 .
To conclude, A(y∗(θ); θ) and S(y∗(θ); θ) are increasing and
decreasing functions of |µ1 − µ0|, respectively.
Lemma 5.2: (Accuracy and sensitivity for Exponen-
tial testing) Consider an hypothesis testing problem with
f0(x;λ0) = λ0e
−λ0x and f1(x;λ1) = λ1e−λ1x, with x ≥ 0,
θ = λ1, and p0 = p1 = 0.5. Then, for classifier CML(x; 1)
and a fixed λ0, S∗(γ) is a decreasing function of accuracy γ.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume 0 < λ0 <
λ1. For p0 = p1 = 0.5, Equation (6) has a single solution
for η = 1 given by y∗(θ) = 1λ1−λ0 log(
λ1
λ0
). Using (8),
A(y∗(θ); θ) = 0.5 + 0.5(r − 1)r− rr−1 ,
where r = λ1λ0 . The sensitivity is given by
S(y∗(θ); θ) =
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂rA(y∗(θ); θ)
∣∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∣ ∂r∂λ1
∣∣∣∣ = log(r)2λ0(r − 1)r− rr−1 .
To conclude, by inspecting the derivatives of A(y∗(θ); θ)
and S(y∗(θ); θ) with respect to r, it can be seen that they
are increasing and decreasing functions of r, respectively.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we show that a fundamental tradeoff exists
between the accuracy of a binary classification algorithm
and its sensitivity to adversarial manipulation of the data.
Thus, accuracy can only be maximized at the expenses of
the sensitivity to data manipulation, and this tradeoff cannot
be arbitrarily improved by tuning the algorithm’s parameters.
Directions of future interest include the extension to M-ary
testing problems, as well as the formal characterization of
the relationships between the complexity of the classification
algorithm and its accuracy versus sensitivity tradeoff.
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